Individual absolute risk aversion is measured in a sample of 1583 male house-hold heads, using the data drawn from the 1995 wave of the Survey on the Income and Wealth of Italian households. This measure, conditional on household financial wealth, is used as an instrument for attained education in a standard log earnings equation. In line with most of the literature, I find that the gap between the IV and the OLS estimates of the returns to education is large. 
Introduction
It is well known that the estimation of the returns to education is difficult because of the presence of measurement errors and because unobserved ability can affect both educational choice and the returns to education. One of the strategies used to deal with this problems consists of selecting instrumental variables, that are correlated with schooling but not with earnings (conditional on schooling). The typical instruments used in the literature are school reforms, family background variables and smoking. An alternative is to use data on twins. See Card (1999) for a review of the existing evidence. In this note I add to the current list an additional candidate, the absolute degree of risk aversion. I start by showing in a simple static model that risk aversion affects in a natural way educational choice by influencing the marginal utility of schooling. Perhaps one reason why this variable has not been used so far is that it is difficult to measure risk aversion in survey data (see Barsky, Juster, Kimball, & Shapiro (1997) and Hartog, Ferrer i Carbonell, & Jonker (2000) for an attempt). I use the 1995 wave of the Survey on the Income and Wealth of Italian households and previous work on these data by Guiso and Paiella (2000) to measure individual absolute risk aversion in a sample of 1583 married Italian male household heads. This variable is then used as an instrument, for education in a standard Mincerian earnings function. In line with most of the current literature, I find that the gap between IV and OLS estimates is substantial.
Schooling choice
Following Card (1999) I assume that an individual chooses S, the years of schooling, by maximizing the following objective function
where y is (hourly) earnings, U is a concave function of y and f is a convex function of S. Hourly earnings are related to S by the following function
In this setup, additional schooling increases earnings and utility U at the price of higher investment costs f. The first order condition associated to the maximization of Eq. (1) is
where the prime if for the first order derivative.
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Using a first order Taylor approximation of UЈ around y=0, Eq. (3) can be re-written as follows
where
is the Arrow Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (see Laffont (1990) 
The expression within curly brackets on the left hand side is negative because of the second order conditions for a maximum. The right hand side is positive.
Let the marginal cost of an additional year of schooling, fЈ(S), be equal to r 1 ϩ r 2 S. Next, assume that the utility function U(y) belong to the CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) class
In this case the coefficient ARA is equal to s, UЈ(0) ϭ 1 and optimal schooling S* is given by 3 S * ϭ S(l,r 1 ,r 2 ,s)
Individual differences in educational attainment can be explained in this simple model both by differences in marginal returns l and marginal costs r and by differences in the absolute degree of risk aversion.
The expected variation of earnings should also matter. In a slight complication of the model, I can add to Eq. (2) the stochastic term n and assume that log earnings are normally distributed with mean lS and variance s ν 2 .
If college wages varied more than, say, high school wages, there is an additional reason why risk aversion can influence educational attainment, because more risk averse individuals will require higher expected earnings to invest in college education.
The empirical model
Consider the standard regression model ln y ϭ XЈd ϩ aS ϩ e (7)
where X is a vector of controls that affect the marginal benefits of education, e and h are error terms, Eq. (7) is the Mincerian earnings function and Eq. (8) is the attainment function, that depends on X and on variables that affect marginal costs and capture individual preferences (Z). Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Eq. (7) yield a consistent estimate of a only when e and h are uncorrelated. Unobserved ability and measurement errors are two well known factors that affect both schooling S and earnings y conditional on schooling, thereby inducing correlation between the error terms. This problem can be addressed if one can identify variables that affect schooling but not (conditional) earnings. These variables can be used as instruments (IV) to generate consistent estimates of the returns to education. Card (1999) presents a detailed review of previous studies based on instrumental variables and discusses the validity of the instruments used in each study. Briefly, these instruments include school reforms and features of the school system, family background and the use of samples of twins. Another instrument recently used but not discussed by Card is smoking. The argument here is that smoking habits are likely to be highly correlated with the discount rate, but do not influence earnings directly.
4 Therefore, they can be used as a valid instrument for schooling S.
The simple model presented in the previous section suggests that a measure of individual absolute risk aversion ARA is another potential candidate. In the model, the variable ARA affects the schooling decision because it affects the marginal utility of income (and consumption), but does not affect the marginal returns to schooling l.
The measure of risk aversion
Following Laffont (1990) , the coefficient of absolute risk aversion at a given level of wealth W is twice the risk premium per unit of variance for small risk. The risk premium is the maximum amount that an agent is willing to pay to have the sure return rather than the expected return from a lottery ticket. According to this definition, risk aversion is not easy to measure and this perhaps explains why it has never been used as an instrument for attained education. A survey that contains detailed information on individual attitudes towards risk is the Italian Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy. The survey is very useful for my purposes because it includes information on earnings, educational attainment, household wealth and attitudes towards risk for a nationally representative sample of households.
In the survey, each household head is offered an hypothetical lottery and is asked to report the maximum price that he would be willing to pay to participate. 5 The exact question is "We would like to ask you a hypothetical question that we would like you to answer as if the situation was a real one. You are offered the opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with the same probability 1/2, to either gain 10 million lire or to gain nothing. What is the most that you are prepared to pay for this security?"
Ten million lire corresponds to just over Euros 5,000. Guiso and Paiella (2000) explain that the interviews were conducted personally by professional interviewers. In order to help the respondent understand the question, they were supposed to show an illustrative card and to provide explanations. The respondent could answer in one of three ways: a) declare the maximum amount he is willing to pay to participate, denoted here by M, known as the compensating certainty equivalent; b) don't know; c) unwilling to answer. 6 Using the information provided by the answers to this question I can measure the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion for each household head. Let W denote the non-random household endowment and let the random prize of the lottery be 10 million lire and 0 with equal probability. The maximum entry price is given by:
5 This section draws extensively from Guiso and Paiella (2000) . 6 Guiso and Paiella (2000) find that the sample selection effects induced by missing answers are small and unlikely to constitute a problem.
Taking a second-order Taylor expansion of the righthand side of Eq. (9) around W yields
that uniquely defines the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion in terms of the parameters of the lottery in the survey. Three problems remain to be discussed before using ARA as a valid instrument of educational attainment in the Mincerian earnings function. First, the measure of absolute risk aversion in Eq. (10) can vary with individual wealth. Laffont (1990) argues that "%it is difficult to obtain sufficient information about an agent's preferences in order to know whether his absolute risk aversion increases or decreases%[with wealth]. However, %since we must assume that absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth to obtain results that accord with both intuition and observations of rational behavior%we can infer that agents must satisfy this assumption in general%" (p. 24).
Clearly, if absolute risk aversion varies with household wealth, and wealth is correlated with hourly (net) earnings, the variable ARA fails to meet the fundamental requirement for an instrumental variable and cannot be used as a valid instrument for schooling S. The availability of detailed information on household real and financial wealth in the SHIW dataset allow me to regress individual ARA on these measures of wealth and to use the residuals of this regression as instruments for schooling. Define this generated variable as RISK. By construction, RISK is orthogonal to household wealth and reflect both individual differences in characteristics (age, education and region of birth) and innate differences in tastes.
A second and more difficult problem is that absolute risk aversion can affect the log earnings of individuals with the same educational attainment by influencing their occupational choice. In this case, the generated variable RISK is not a valid instrument. I evaluate in detail this possibility in the next section.
A third problem is that educational choice depends on absolute risk aversion at the time of the choice, not on current risk aversion. Therefore, my measure of risk aversion is meaningful only if the time invariant component of risk is important. Empirical evidence in support of the importance of innate preferences is provided by Guiso and Paiella (2000) , who find that the main predictor of absolute risk aversion in the SHIW sample is region of birth.
Finally, there is no particular reason to expect that risk aversion, conditional on household wealth, be correlated with unmeasured ability. The maintained hypothesis used in the model and in the empirical exercise is that the causal relation runs from absolute risk aversion to educational attainment, not vice versa.
Empirical results
I estimate Eq. (7) using the sample of married male household heads aged between 28 and 55 years with at least primary education, who were employed full-time and for the full year in 1995. As a preliminary step, I regress ARA on two measures of household wealth, financial wealth FW, that includes all financial assets held by the household in 1995, and the dummy H, equal to 1 if the household head owns the house she lives in.
7 I also add a control for household size, the number of household members NC.
The summary statistics of the key variables used in this section are in Table 1 . The results of the regression are shown in Table 2 . As expected, the measure of absol- 7 I exclude household net income, because an important part of it is the household head's personal net income. The inclusion of this variable would remove part of the correlation between risk aversion and log earnings. At the extreme, the instrument would lose its power completely. ute risk aversion is negatively correlated to financial wealth FW and positively correlated to household size NC, given wealth. On the other hand, house ownership is positively but not significantly correlated to risk aversion.
Notice that the selected measures of household wealth absorb only 1.8% of the total variation of absolute risk aversion. I use the residuals and the estimated constant term from the regression in Table 2 to construct the variable RISK. The sample average and the sample standard deviation of this variable are 0.128 and 0.094 respectively.
As mentioned above, RISK could affect log earnings, conditional on schooling, by influencing occupational choice. I deal with this problem by using three different definitions of job/occupation. The first definition distinguishes between jobs in the private and in the public sector. The second definition allocates individuals in four occupational categories: blue collar, white collar, school teacher and managerial employee. The third definition combines the previous two and adds information on sector of activity (industry, services and the public sector) to obtain 10 occupational categories.
8 I use the first definition to run a probit regression where the dependent variable is the probability of joining the public sector and the explanatory variables are years of schooling S, the controls in the vector X (age, age squared, marital status, regional and urban residence dummies 9 ) and RISK. Since the p-value of the estimated coefficient associated to RISK is 0.43, my filtered measure of risk aversion does not significantly affect the choice of public versus private sector jobs. Next, I fit two multinomial logits for the more detailed job definitions by using the same regressors as above, and test whether RISK significantly affects choice. In both cases, the c 2 statistic rejects significance at the 5 percent level of confidence.
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As a final check, I consider the most detailed classification of occupations and select jobs that are filled by individuals with the same educational attainment. For each selected job, I show in Table 3 the fitted average log hourly wage (Fy), obtained by adding the residuals to the constant term in a regression of log y on X, and the average value of RISK. To save space, I choose two jobs for each educational attainment, and require these jobs to have similar values of average RISK.
Consider first individuals with only primary education (S=5). The white collar jobs in the public sector filled by these individuals pay a significantly higher average log hourly wage than the blue collar jobs in services, but attract individuals with the same average RISK. Next consider individuals with a college degree. In this case, managerial jobs in services pay a higher average hourly wage than white collar jobs in the same sector, but are filled by individuals with the same average RISK. Pair- wise comparisons for intermediate levels of education yield similar results: conditional on education, the between-jobs variation in the average hourly wage is not accompanied by a similar variation in the average value of risk aversion, thereby confirming that RISK does not affect log earnings, conditional on schooling S and controls X.
Overall, I take this evidence as supportive of my selection of RISK as a valid instrument for schooling in the earnings regression. An instrument needs also to be correlated with S, the endogenous variable. Table 4 presents the results of the reduced form schooling equation (with and without age squared among the controls). As predicted by theory, I find that, conditional on age, years of schooling are significantly higher for individuals with lower RISK.
My estimates of the returns to education are presented in Table 5 . I find that the estimated marginal return to schooling based on OLS is 0.047. This return rises to 0.078, a 65% increase, when I use the IV procedure with RISK as the instrument for schooling. The gap between the two estimates is substantial. The IV estimate, however, is less precise than the OLS estimate and I cannot reject the hypothesis that the two estimated coefficients are equal. Similar results are common in the literature that uses school reforms or family background as instruments for educational attainment (see Harmon & Walker (1995) for a discussion).
The large estimated gap between IV and OLS is difficult to explain with the presence of measurement errors, that according to Card (1999) can account for at most a 10% gap. An alternative explanation, also suggested by Card, is that variations in RISK affect to a higher extent the subgroups of the population with lower education, who have higher marginal returns to schooling. Guiso and Paiella show that consumers born in the industrialized North of the country are less risk averse than consumers born in the underdeveloped South, who are typically less educated than average. An exogenous reduction in risk aversion, induced perhaps by a more effective government control of criminal activities, is likely to affect more Southern households, who live in crime intensive regions, are less educated and have higher marginal returns to education, and to produce as a consequence a higher IV estimate of the average returns to schooling.
Summary
In this note I have added to the current list of instruments for endogenous schooling in an earnings regression a new entry, the absolute degree of risk aversion. I have used the 1995 wave of the Survey on the Income and Wealth of Italian households to measure this variable in a sample of 1583 married Italian male household heads. In line with an important part of the relevant literature, I have found that the IV estimate of the marginal return to schooling is much higher than the OLS estimate.
